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CASE COMMENTS
conviction and resentence the defendant, as right and justice may
seem to require and discharge the defendant from custody on bail
pending such resentence. No such judgment shall be opened or
vacated if a writ of error is pending to review the judgment." N.J.
REv. STAT. § 2:190-15 (1937).
While a solution would be desirable, the absence of cases in
which the suggested problem has arisen suggests the possibility
that such a solution is less essential in practice than in theory.
J. S. T.
Cun miAi LAw-PrE oF NoT GnTY-CoacMxoN BY JUDGE.-
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before
the United States District Court of Western Oklahoma. The plea
was entered without benefit of an attorney which the court had
offered but the defendant had refused. Immediately thereafter the
court stated to the defendant that if he was found guilty upon trial
he would get the maximum punishment provided by law for put-
ting the government to the expense of a trial by not entering a
plea of guilty. At the trial the defendant withdrew his plea of not
guilty and entered a plea of guilty and sentence was imposed. Held,
reversing the lower court, that the fundamental standards of proce-
dure in criminal cases require that a plea of guilty be entered freely,
voluntarily and without semblance of coercion. The trial court's
statements were reasonably calculated to coerce the defendant into a
guilty plea. Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957).
A plea of guilty entered other than voluntarily by the de-
fendant has consistently been held incapable of supporting a sen-
tence imposed thereon for the obvious reason that it deprives the
defendant of a trial by jury and violates his rights guaranteed under
the due process clause of the Constitution. United States v. Swag-
gerty, 849 U.S. 959 (1952); O'Hara v. People, 41 Mich. 623, 8 N.W.
161 (1878); Flowers v. State, 90 Old. Cr. 390, 214 P.2d 728 (1950).
It would appear under proper circumstances that there is no reason
why such a plea should not be accepted by the court. Brown v.
State, 92 Fla. 592, 109 So. 627 (1926); People v. Merhige, 212 Mich.
601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920). It would in fact, as stated in the prin-
cipal case, save the expense and time required by a jury trial.
Recognizing this our judicial tribunals have laid down stringent
rules to insure the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights
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when such a plea has been entered. It is universally required that
the court inform the prisoner of the results of such a plea and that
it be satisfied that he has acted freely and deliberately and with
full knowledge, appreciating and understanding the nature and
consequences of his plea before it be accepted by the court. State
v. Hill, 81 W. Va. 676, 95 S.E. 21 (1918); Clay v. State, 82 Fla. 88,
89 So. 358 (1921).
The rule thus soundly established must still be applied to the
facts of each case to determine whether or not the plea was volun-
tarily entered. Helms v. Humphrey, 63 F. Supp. 4 (D. Minn. 1945).
One yardstick used to determine this was whether or not an inno-
cent man would have been induced to enter a plea of guilty under
similar inducements. If he would have been, the defendant's con-
stitutional rights have been abridged. Palmer v. Croner, 45 Wn.
2d 278, 273 P.2d 985 (1954).
This measure clearly eliminates those cases in which the de-
fendant's motive is to obtain a lesser sentence by, in effect, throw-
ing himself upon the mercy of the court even though the thought
may have been planted by counsel. Mooney v. Holohon, 294 U.S.
103 (1935); People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422, 54 P.2d 657 (1944);
Helms v. Humphrey, supra.
It is also a good basis for justifying the many decisions which
have held that a plea of guilty obtained by actual physical or mental
coercion or duress unduly placed upon the defendant by state and
federal officers after his arrest must be rejected. Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942); Flowers v. State, supra. However, the effects
are not so clear in cases where the defendant pleads guilty to a
lesser charge to avoid trial on a greater one and the circumstances
are such that the plea was encouraged by counsel as the reasonable
thing to do. Broccoli v. Kindelan, 80 R.I. 436, 98 A.2d 67 (1952);
State v. LaMarr, 231 Ind. 500, 109 N.E.2d 457 (1952). This is not
because the defendant is not guilty of some crime, but because he
has been induced to enter into a bargain to plead guilty to a crime
of which he is in fact not guilty. Cf. Broccoli v. Kindelan, supra;
State v. LaMarr, supra. It seems reasonable to believe that many
such instances have occurred and consequently the defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated.
Bargaining though not generally considered to be a violation
of the due process clause may be if unqualified factual represen-
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tations are made to the defendant by responsible officers of the
state that a reward in the form of immunity or a lesser punishment
than might be expected will be given in return for a plea of guilty
and the defendant, in good faith, relies on these promises, and
pleads guilty. The effect has been to preclude the exercise of free
will and judgment by the defendant and his plea is not voluntary.
People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422, 145 P.2d 657 (1944).
Because constitutional rights are involved here it is necessary
that the defendant's plea be made voluntarily and with full knowl-
edge and understanding on his part and that the rules for accepting
such a plea be strictly adhered to by the courts. Even though the
principal case may be distinguished from the majority of cases on
this point, because the coercion was done in open court by a trial
judge, its ruling inevitably follows these well established criminal
law principles ordained to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants.
G. D. G.
EVmENCE-WGnT OF EVmENCE AND CRmDBILrT OF Wrr-
NmssEs-JUoRO's CovmvoN KNWVLEDGE AND ExmuENcE.-P's de-
cedent was fatally injured when an automobile driven by D at an
excessive speed left the road and -went into a creek. D testified that
at the time of the accident he felt the effects of beer which he had
consumed during the course of the evening and that he had driven
at excessive speed earlier on the evening of the accident. Judg-
ment for P. Held, reversing lower court, that P's decedent was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when he knew
or should have known of the great danger incident to the journey
and, though having reasonable opportunity to leave the automobile,
voluntarily continued therein as a passenger. Hutchinson v.
Mitchell, 101 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1957).
The subject of this comment is a question raised in the dis-
senting opinion of Browning, J., in the principal case, of the
propriety of a juror's use of his common general knowledge and
experience in determining the weight and credibility to be given
to the evidence presented before him.
In general a juror may act only upon evidence that is properly
presented before him during the course of the trial; but this does
not preclude him from acting upon and taking notice of facts that
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